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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO
REGULATING HEALTH CLAIMS IN FOOD ADVERTISING
by Timothy T. Hughes*

I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1984, federal regulations effectively prohibited health
claims in food labeling and advertising.' In recent years, however,
public policy makers have taken a
more permissive approach. 2 The
result has been a proliferation of
claims in food advertising suggesting that use of a product decreases
the risk of certain chronic diseases,
such as coronary heart disease,
high blood pressure, cancer, and
osteoporosis. Behind the great increase in the use of health claims in
food advertising a public policy
debate continues over how much
scientific support should exist before food processors may lawfully
make these health claims. The two
federal agencies that oversee the
use of health claims in food promotions, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"),
differ on the necessary level of
scientific support.
In the fall of 1990, Congress
passed, and President Bush signed,
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990. 3 The passage of
this Act ends the debate surrounding the standard that the FDA
should apply. The Act permits
health claims on labels for a limited number of diet-disease relationships and will require a
"significant agreement ... among
qualified experts" on claims, before allowing the use of those
claims. 4 This does not, however,
end the entire public policy debate;
the FTC still has a different standard, and even the FDA will have
to apply and interpret the standard
that Congress has now established.
Generally, the FTC requires the
level of support for health claims
which consumers would expect
acting reasonably under the circumstances. The FTC applies a
six-part test to determine: (1)
whether that support should be

4

well-controlled scientific tests, and
(2) what level of agreement should
exist regarding the results of those
tests among scientists in the field
to support the claims.5 Responding
to the proposed FDA rule, the FTC
staff has voiced concern that the
new FDA standard might prevent
useful and truthful information
from reaching the public because
the standard requires more scientific support than is needed to
safeguard the physical and 6 economic welfare of consumers.

This does not, however, end
the entire public policy
debate; the FTC still has a
different standard, and even
the FDA will have to apply and
interpret the standard that
Congress has now
established.
This article explores the different approaches to health claims by
the FTC and FDA. First, the article
examines the regulatory mandates
of the FTC and the FDA and
summarizes the historical development of each agency's approach to
health claims. Second, the article
provides a comparative analysis of
the FTC's flexible approach and
the FDA's newly proposed "significant agreement" standard. Finally, the article concludes that
although there is agreement between the agencies that health
claims should be permitted, the
FTC's standard is preferable to the
proposed FDA rule because it provides a more flexible approach that
protects consumer interests without obstructing the free flow of
information.
II.BACKGROUND TO THE FDA
AND FTC APPROACHES TO
HEALTH CLAIMS.
Although the FTC and FDA are

separate and distinct agencies,
each with its own enabling legislation and regulations,7 a large overlap exists in the FTC's and the
FDA's jurisdiction. Section 5 of
the FTC Act empowers the Commission to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.8 In addition, the Act
specifically makes it unlawful to
disseminate any false or deceptive
advertisement, by any means, if its
purpose is to induce the public to
buy food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics. 9 Although not expressly
stated, the FTC assumes broad
discretion to regulate both advertising and labeling practices generally.
Conversely, the FDA has specific statutory authority over food
labeling and only indirect authority over advertising. The Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act provides that a
food is misbranded and subject to
seizure if "[ilts labeling is false or
misleading..

.,"10

The FDA's indi-

rect authority over food advertising is through its authorization to
regulate the sale of drugs.I A food
can be considered a drug if promotional materials including advertisements for it made disease-specific health claims.' 2 As a drug, the
product would have to meet stringent FDA testing requirements;
otherwise, it could be seized."
Thus, health claims in food advertising may effectively subject a
product to the FDA's authority
and regulations
affecting both food
4
and drugs.'
With two agencies regulating the
same area of commerce, potential
for duplication of efforts and differences in enforcement policies
inevitably arise. Because food pro*Senior Staff Attorney, Chicago Regional
Office, Federal Trade Commission; J.D.
Northwestern University. The views expressedin this articlearethose ofthe author.
They do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Commission or any of its members.
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ducers are subject to liability under
either Act, they logically prefer to
err on the side of caution and
follow the agency with the more
restrictive policies. As a consequence, the standards and practices of the agency with the least
restrictive policies become redundant and confusing to the public,
not to mention wasteful of government resources. To lessen the possibility of such problems arising,
the FDA and the FTC entered into
an informal agreement in 1971,
which gives the FTC primary jurisdiction over food advertising, and
the FDA primary jurisdiction over
food labeling. 5
In the last decade, the two agencies have taken very different approaches to health claims. Prior to
1984, FDA regulations prohibited
the use of health claims in promoting foods. Indeed, a food was considered misbranded if its labeling
represented, suggested, or implied:
(1) [t]hat the food because of
the presence or absence of
certain dietary properties, is
adequate or effective in the
prevention, cure, mitigation,
or treatment of any disease or
symptom."16
The FTC, on the other hand, did
not adopt any specific regulations
dealing with health claims despite
a contrary staff recommendation
in 1978.17 Instead, the FTC dealt
with health claims on a case-bycase basis, applying its unfairness
and deception standards.' 8 Although the FTC had no prohibition against using health claims,
the FDA's prohibition was sufficient to foreclose such claims in
labeling and advertising, since the
FDA continued its practice of ensuring that food products advertised did not make disease-specific
health claims.' 9
In 1984, when the Kellogg Company began using health messages
in All Bran advertisements, the
FDA suspended its practice of prohibiting health claims in advertising, effectively allowing the advertisements.2 0 In February 1990,
without ever revoking its regulations prohibiting health claims, the
FDA adopted an "interim enforcement policy."' 2' This policy speci-
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fled six areas in which enough
evidence may exist to establish the
relationship of a food to a disease
to permit health claims in marketing. These include: (1) calcium and
osteoporosis, (2) dietary fiber and
cancer, (3) lipids and cardiovascular disease, (4) lipids and cancer,
(5) sodium and hypertension, and
(6) dietary fiber and cardiovascular
disease.2 2 Food processors which
currently make health claims operate under this interim enforcement
policy.
Ill. FTC POLICY GOVERNING
HEALTH CLAIMS IN
ADVERTISING
Recent statemefits by individual
Commissioners and by FTC staff
indicate a desire to continue with

In 1984, when the Kellogg
Company began using health
messages in All Bran
advertisements, the FDA
suspended its practice of
prohibiting health claims in
advertising, effectively
allowing the advertisements.
the approach it has taken until
now. The FTC staff has submitted
written comments three times
since the FDA began its formal
rulemaking procedures.2 3 Each
time, the FTC staff emphasized the
virtue of its own case-by-case approach as being more flexible. Indeed, three Commissioners have
each recently argued that truthful
non-deceptive 2 claims
should not
4
be suppressed.
Under the FTC standard, health
claims in food advertising must
conform to the same scrutiny applied to any other product. Thus, a
deceptive representation is one
that is material and is likely to
mislead a consumer acting reason25
ably under the circumstances.
The representation, whether express or implied, must therefore
meet each of the following three
criteria to violate the Act: (1) it
must be false or misleading, (2)
when viewed from the perspective
of a consumer acting reasonably

under the circumstances, and (3) it
must cause Consumer injury,
whether measurable or 2presumed
6
from the circumstances.
An advertising claim can be
false or misleading, in violation of
the FTC Act, when the claim itself
is false or when there is no reasonable basis for the claim. 2

7

In the

area of food and health care products, the FTC has generally viewed
outlandish claims of magic elixirs,
unqualified claims of cures or misrepresentations of specific studies
to be false claims in advertising.
Qualified health claims about the
special health benefits of foods are
more likely to be analyzed under
the "substantiation doctrine."
A. Claims That Are False or
Misleading In Themselves
Proving that a food product
claim is false or misleading presents a special problem when the
claim deals with health. Health
claims are unlike other more "concrete" claims such as those promoting the sale of a franchise or
memberships in travel clubs. If a
franchisor claims to have one hundred franchisees or a travel club
claims that members can fly to
Hawaii for $50.00, it is possible to
ultimately prove the truth or falsity
of the claim. Health claims, however, are more amorphous and commonly involve the many intricacies
and unknowns of biochemistry and
nutrition. Biochemists, endocrinologists, epidemiologists and other scientists are reluctant to state
that a given proposition cannot be
proven true. Rather, they would
reason that a proposition has not
been proven since there is always
the possibility that it could be true.
Despite this difficulty, the FTC
has filed many actions in which it
has alleged, and succeeded in proving, that a health claim is false or
misleading. For example, in
Pharmtech Research, Inc.,28 a National Academy of Sciences report
encouraged the use of dried greens
to reduce the risk of cancer. It was
a relatively simple matter to determine whether the report substantiated the express claims. The FTC
without much effort proved that
(continued on page 6)
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the claim was false. In fact, the case
was clear enough for a district
court to grant a preliminary injunction to enjoin promotion of
the claim. 29 Similarly, the FTC
challenged an unqualified claim
that "there is no evidence that
eating eggs will increase the risk of
heart disease"; the claim was found
to be false, 0 as were claims associated with weight-loss pills.3
Upon a finding that a claim is
false or misleading, the FTC or a
court may prohibit all future use of
the challenged claim.3 2 A party
under an order containing such a
flat prohibition would have to seek
an order modification or risk immediate civil penalties or contempt proceedings before reasserting the false claim.33 Thus, in order
to modify a flat prohibition, the
claimant must prove that a scientific breakthrough has occurred
warranting an order modification.
B. Claims That Are False Or
Misleading Because They Lack
Substantiation
Health claims made in couched
and qualified language that certain
foods have special health benefits
are more likely to be examined
under the FTC's "substantiation
doctrine" to determine if there is a
reasonable basis for the claim.3 4
The advertising substantiation
doctrine evolved from the notion
that along with any product claim
comes the added assertion, either
express or implied, that there is a
reasonable basis for the claim. For
example, if a food advertiser
claims that amino acid supplements will help build bigger muscles quickly, any reasonable consumer likely will believe that the
advertiser has a reasonable basis
for the claim. 35 The advertising
substantiation doctrine places the
burden on the party making the
claim to demonstrate a reasonable
basis. Thus, the FTC does not have
to determine whether or not the
health claim is true or false, possible or impossible. Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether "prior,
fully documented, adequate and
6

well-controlled scientific studies or
tests..."a6 exist to substantiate the
claim.
The FTC first articulated the
framework for applying this doctrine in Pfizer, Inc..3 7 The FTC
reasoned that if an advertisement
expressly states the level of substantiation, such as "clinically
proven effective," then consumers
and the FTC would expect that
well-designed clinical tests to have
been performed and that actual
results support the claim. Accordingly, unsubstantiated health care
claims in advertising would be
misleading to the consuming public regardless of whether the substantive claim itself is false because
the claim-that there is a reasonable basis for the substantive
claim-is false.
In determining what level of
substantiation should exist for a
claim when no specific level of
support is claimed (i.e "clinically
proven"), the FTC considers the
following six factors: (1) the nature
of the product involved, (2) the
type of claim, (3) the benefits of a
truthful claim, (4) the cost of developing substantiation, (5) the consequences of a false claim, and (6) the
reasonable amount of substantiation 38
according to experts in the
field.

Recently, the substantiation
doctrine has been used to
challenge the health claims of
Kraft Singles, Campbell's
Soup, and Mazola Corn Oil.
The application of these six factors has been called the FTC's
"flexible approach. '3 9 Essentially
it is a cost-benefit analysis. It
weighs the costs to society of permitting a false claim against the
benefits of permitting the claim if
it is proven to be true. This approach is most useful in the field of
nutrition, where the research suggests enormous potential benefits,
but where a great deal of uncertainty about these findings still remains.
For example, a claim that a
certain food promotes a clear facial
complexion would not require as

high a level of substantiation as a
claim that a certain food supplement will cure a severe virus. The
truthfulness of the first claim is
readily discernable to one who
looks in the mirror and the consequences of its falsity are not as
great as the consequences of the
virus claim. Because the virus
claim may be difficult to verify,
greater scientific scrutiny is warranted to ensure that no factors
other than the specified food will
produce the claimed effect. Both
the consumer and the FTC would
raise or lower their expectations
depending on the nature, use, and
potential harm of the product.
Recently, the substantiation
doctrine has been used to challenge
the health claims of Kraft Singles,
Campbell's0 Soup, and Mazola
Corn Oil.4 Each illustrates the
difficulty consumers and the FTC
face in sorting out the health benefits of these food products. Thus, in
Kraft, Inc.,41 the FTC alleged that
Kraft misrepresented that its Kraft
Singles cheese slices contained as
much calcium as five ounces of
milk.42 Similarly, in Campbell Soup
Co., the food ads link the low fat,
low cholesterol content of its soups
with a reduced risk of some forms
of heart disease, but fail to disclose
that the soups contain high sodium
levels which may increase the risk
of heart disease. The FTC has also
charged CPC International, Inc.,
the maker of Mazola Corn Oil,
with deceptively representing that
adding Mazola to a diet without
other dietary changes will cause a
17% reduction in serum cholesterol levels, when in fact it did not
have a43 reasonable basis for that
claim.
While a finding that a claim is
false may result in a flat prohibition of that claim being made in
the future, a finding that a claim
lacks adequate substantiation results in only a prohibition of the
dissemination of that claim unless
and until it has been substantiated. 44 The possibility that the claim
itself may be true is left open for
future testing. Thus, when the finding is merely that there is a lack of
adequate substantiation, there are
difficulties in bringing an enforcement action.
Volume 3 Number I/Fall, 1990
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IV.THE FDA'S APPROACH IN
CONTRAST TO THE FTC'S
In contrast to the FTC's case-bycase, six-factor flexible approach,
the FDA has proposed rules which
would enable the agency to develop
uniform labeling statements and
consumer health messages for the
six health areas identified in the
interim enforcement policy where
the relationship of diet to health
has been established -

specifical-

ly, (1) calcium and osteoporosis,
(2) dietary fiber and cancer, (3)
lipids and cardiovascular disease,
(4) lipids and cancer, (5) sodium
and hypertension, and (6) dietary
45
fiber and cardiovascular disease.
According to the rule, these statements and summaries must be
based on a uniformly high level of
agreement among scientists:
[s]uch a statement [health
message] must be based on
the totality of publicly available scientific evidence, including evidence from welldesigned studies conducted
in a manner that is consistent
with generally recognized scientific procedures and principles. A significant agreement
must exist among qualified
experts that the statement is
supported
by such evi46
dence.

Moreover, the rule provides that
any manufacturer who deviates
from these accepted findings,
"would subject their products to
substantial risk of regulatory action under the food and drug misbranding provisions as well as the
'47
new drug provisions of the act."
This same standard has been
adopted in the "Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990. ' ' 48 The
significant agreement standard is
quite different from the FTC's
approach in several respects. First,
the new standard requires significant scientific agreement. By contrast, the FTC may permit scientifically controversial claims
provided that one or two well-designed tests support the claims.
Second, the proposal requires scientific evidence to be publicly
available, while the FTC accepts
non-public proprietary evidence.
Rules and enforcement policies
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that limit health claims can err
either by permitting too many deceptive claims to slip through the
regulatory nets or by chilling even
non-deceptive claims from being
released. The FDA's "significant
agreement" approach runs the risk
of over-deterrence. It may prevent
even truthful non-deceptive claims
from being made. For example,
conspicuously absent from the list
of six areas in which the FDA
suggests that there may be agreement is the relationship between
foods high in beta carotene such as
broccoli, cabbage, brussels sprouts,
and cancer risks. Perhaps, the FDA
does not believe that the scientific
community has reached significant
agreement on this diet-disease connection. Nevertheless, consumers
would benefit from allowing food
processors to provide information
about the diet-disease relationships in marketing their products.
Likewise, there would appear to be
injury to consumers from withholding this information.

A study of the cereal industry
conducted by the FTC's
Bureau of Economics, for
example, demonstrated the
benefits of permitting health
claims... During the period
when the FTC permitted
health claims there was a
significant shift in
consumption toward higher
fiber cereals...
A study of the cereal industry
conducted by the FTC's Bureau of
Economics, for example, demonstrated the benefits of permitting
health claims. 49 The study compared the 1978 - 1984 period when
the FTC prohibited health claims
to the subsequent period when
health claims were permitted. During the period when the FTC permitted health claims there was a
significant shift in consumption
toward higher fiber cereals, a
marked increase in the introduction of new cereal products with
higher fiber and a greater number
of less educated and non-caucasian

women choosing higher fiber cereals.5 0
A "significant agreement" is appropriate before permitting certain
claims that could have very serious
consequences if they should turn
out to be false. In fact, it is entirely
conceivable in some instances that
the level of substantiation under
the FTC flexible approach would
be the same as under the FDA
significant support standard. The
cost to consumers of a false claim
in an area related to heart disease
could be very high; thus, upon
application of the FTC's approach
a very high level of scientific certainty to substantiate the claim
may be required. The specifics of
the claim will generally dictate the
level of certainty required. An advertisement that suggests that a
bowl of oat bran in the morning
will offset the effects of a bowl of
ice cream in the evening would
encourage risky behavior. Before
claims such as this would be permitted, it would be reasonable to
require a very high degree of certainty that the claim is true. Both
the FTC and the FDA could be
expected to require a high degree of
scientific
certainty for such
5
claims. '
V. ROOTS OF THE DIFFERENT
APPROACHES
The different mandates of the
FTC and the FDA and the different media that the agencies regulate provide assistance in explaining the basis of the different
standards. The FTC's mandate directs the Commission "to prevent
persons, partnerships or corporations.., from using unfair methods of competition in commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce." 52 In addition to preventing unfair and deceptive trade practices, the FTC
mandate ensures a competitive
marketplace through enforcement
of the antitrust laws over which it
has jurisdiction. To fulfill its mission, the FTC employs lawyers and
economists, and most of its efforts
focus on preventing economic injury. To prevent consumer injury
and maximize consumer welfare
(continued on page 8)
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the FTC operates to remove obstacles to the free flow of information.
Because economic injury that results from false or imperfect information is often reversible, some
under-deterrence is tolerable.
By contrast, the FDA's "first
level of concern is related to protection of the public health."53 To
fulfill its mandate, the FDA employs largely health care professionals, and most of its efforts are
focused on preventing physical injury to the public. Because physical
injury is often irreversible, the
FDA tolerates little under-deterrence.

The different mandates of the
FTC and the FDA and the
different media that the
agencies regulate provide
assistance in explaining the
basis of the different
standards.
The FTC's perspective is also
influenced by the fact that it has
primary responsibility for food advertising, but not for packaging or
labeling. The different goals and
limitations of advertising and labeling may justify different rules
for health claims. The Association
of National Advertisers ("ANA")
has recently, taken this position in
commenting on the FDA's Proposed Rulemaking:
[w]hile the advertising industry has a legitimate and real
interest in the development
of food labeling regulation,
ANA must stress that advertising is not labeling and must
not be expected to convey the
same quantity or kind of information to consumers.
Overloading advertising with
excessively detailed governmentally [sic] mandated requirements will destroy the
effectiveness of advertising in
the marketplace. Also, unlike
labeling, differences in the
nature and capacity of the
various media must be taken

8

into account in regard
to ad54
vertising regulation.
The FTC staff filed comments in
the FDA rulemaking proceedings
that gave at least nodding assent to
this distinction: "[w]e recognize.. .that significant differences
between health claims on food labels and those in advertising may
require different regulatory approaches." 55
The differences in the nature
and capacity of the media used in
labeling and advertising may warrant some regulatory differences. It
may make sense, for example, to
require specific uniform words in
labeling or to require disclosures
that would be overly costly and
even ineffective in advertisements
on television or radio. However,
the differing nature of advertising
and labeling does not justify requiring a consensus of scientific
opinion for health claims in labeling while only a reasonable basis is
required for health claims in advertising. These contrasting approaches do not appear to have any
basis in the different media
through which the claim is communicated.
V. CONCLUSION
The FTC's approach provides
the necessary flexibility to consider
the special risks of injury involved
in health claims for food while at
the same time taking into account
the potential for the benefit of
permitting health claims. At least
for now, it appears that the FTC
and FDA approaches will continue. These differences have actually
become less pronounced in recent
years. The Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990 and the
FDA's recently proposed regulations will formalize a more permissive policy toward health claims.
On the fundamental question there
appears to be agreement-both
agencies agree that health claims
should be permitted. The existing
differences that were highlighted in
the debate over the correct standard will influence the future application of these standards to specific fact situations.
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Health Claims in Food Advertising: A
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Study of the Cereal Market, Bureau of
Economics Staff Report, Federal Trade
Commission, Aug. 1989.
Id. at 115.
While the FTC does not have regulations that would pre-screen such
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the lengthier administrative trial.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
Reproposed Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 5179.
Comments of the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., at 4 (April 16,
1990).
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Drug, and Cosmetic Act if the FTC does
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